Growth Metrics: Revenue CAGR, Same-Store Sales

Two numbers separate companies that are actually growing from companies that are just getting bigger: revenue CAGR and same-store sales. Almost every "record revenue" headline you read is compatible with a contracting underlying business, because the headline doesn't isolate organic demand from the simple act of opening more locations or closing an acquisition. CAGR fixes the time-series problem (growth volatility hidden inside arithmetic averages); same-store sales fixes the unit-economics problem (revenue inflation by store count). Apply them together and the growth picture sharpens immediately.
Why CAGR Beats an Average
Compound annual growth rate is the constant rate that, applied year after year, produces the observed end value:
CAGR = (Ending Value / Beginning Value)^(1/n) − 1
where n is the number of years between the endpoints. The point of CAGR is not just smoothing — it's that arithmetic averages systematically overstate compounded outcomes when growth is volatile, because they ignore the order in which gains and losses arrive.
A worked example. Suppose annual revenue growth over five years is 15%, −3%, 22%, 8%, 12%. The simple arithmetic mean is (15 − 3 + 22 + 8 + 12) / 5 = 10.8%. The compounded result, however, is:
1.15 × 0.97 × 1.22 × 1.08 × 1.12 = 1.6452
so the actual CAGR is 1.6452^(1/5) − 1 = 10.34%. The two numbers differ by less than half a percent here because volatility is mild. Push volatility higher (say, +50%, −40%, +30%, −10%, +25%) and the arithmetic mean stays at 11% while CAGR drops to roughly 7.7% — the gap balloons because compounding penalizes drawdowns. A simple-average growth rate that exceeds CAGR by more than ~3 percentage points is a flag that the underlying revenue series is volatile, and the cause is worth investigating before you assume the business is "growing 10–11% a year."
Apple's Real CAGRs (Recalculated From the 10-K)
Apple's GAAP total net sales by fiscal year, taken from the 10-K filings:
| Fiscal year (ended Sept) | Total net sales ($M) |
|---|---|
| FY2015 | 233,715 1 |
| FY2020 | 274,515 2 |
| FY2022 | 394,328 3 |
| FY2023 | 383,285 3 |
| FY2024 | 391,035 3 |
| FY2025 | 416,161 4 |
Run the CAGR formula across the relevant horizons:
3-year (FY22 → FY25): (416,161 / 394,328)^(1/3) − 1 = (1.0554)^(0.333) − 1 = 1.81%
5-year (FY20 → FY25): (416,161 / 274,515)^(1/5) − 1 = (1.5160)^(0.2) − 1 = 8.66%
10-year (FY15 → FY25): (416,161 / 233,715)^(1/10) − 1 = (1.7807)^(0.1) − 1 = 5.94%
The 5-year reading sits well above the 10-year reading, which tells you Apple's mid-decade slowdown (FY15–FY20 grew at just 3.27% CAGR) is being averaged in over the longer window, while the post-COVID surge (FY20–FY22 jumped 19.8% per year) lifted the recent five. The 3-year reading is a red flag of its own: revenue has barely grown since FY22, with FY23 actually lower than FY22 in nominal dollars. The growth story you tell about Apple depends entirely on which two endpoints you pick. This is not a quirk — it is the single most common way revenue CAGR misleads investors, and the fix is to always quote at least two horizons and inspect the year-by-year series.
For benchmarking against the broader market, the trailing 10-year average annual revenue growth rate for the S&P 500 was 5.1% (2014–2023), and FactSet's estimated full-year revenue growth for CY2024 was also 5.1%.5 Index-level revenue growth has been remarkably stable in the 4–6% band for over a decade; any "8% S&P revenue CAGR" claim should be checked against the source. Apple's 10-year compounded revenue growth is, in this light, modestly above the index — not the runaway grower the press treatment of FY25 might suggest.
A Simple Rule for CAGR Endpoints
The number is only as honest as the start and end years. Pick a recession trough as the start (FY09 for many US companies) and a cyclical peak as the end (FY21 for Apple, with the COVID device-upgrade cycle running hot), and you can build a "10-year CAGR" that bears no resemblance to underlying growth capacity. Two practical defenses:
- Use the company's own fiscal-year endpoints, not the latest trailing twelve months. Quarterly extrapolation amplifies seasonality and one-off items into the headline.
- Compute CAGR over rolling 3-, 5-, and 10-year windows and compare them. Wide divergence (more than ~5 percentage points between the 3- and 10-year reads, as is true for Apple now) means the trajectory is unstable, and the single number on its own is misleading.
Same-Store Sales: The Test That Catches Hidden Decline
Total revenue can grow indefinitely from store openings, acquisitions, and currency tailwinds without a single existing location selling more product. Same-store sales (also called comparable-store sales, comps, or like-for-like sales) measures the year-over-year revenue change from a fixed base of locations open at least 12 to 13 months. New stores enter the comp base only after they hit their anniversary; closures drop out. The metric isolates demand at the unit level.
Most retailers further decompose comps into two drivers:
Comparable transactions × Average ticket = Same-store sales growth
Comparable transactions count customer visits; average ticket is dollars per transaction. The decomposition matters because transaction-led growth is more durable than ticket-led growth. A retailer raising prices into a softening base can post positive comps for several quarters before customers actually leave; the ticket gains run out long before the trend reverses, and by then the transaction column has been printing red for a year.
Starbucks FY2024: Why "+1% Revenue" Hid a Traffic Collapse
Starbucks reported full fiscal year 2024 results on October 30, 2024 (year ended September 29, 2024). The headlines:
- Consolidated net revenues: $36.2 billion, up 1% year over year. 6
- Global comparable store sales: −2% for the full year, −7% in Q4. 6
- U.S. Q4 comparable transactions: −10%. Average ticket: +4%. 6
- China Q4 comparable store sales: −14%, with average ticket −8% and transactions −6%. 6
Two things become visible immediately if you decompose. First, the +1% revenue line was carried entirely by net new stores opened during the year — same-store traffic was contracting at a double-digit rate in the most important domestic market. Second, the +4% U.S. ticket increase is what kept the Q4 comp at −6% in North America rather than something closer to −10%; the price/mix lever was masking the traffic problem, not solving it. A reader who saw only the $36.2B headline would have concluded "growing"; a reader who decomposed comps would have concluded "shrinking demand at every existing store, partially offset by price."
The structural test that follows from this case: if reported total revenue grows but transactions in the comp base are negative for two or more consecutive quarters, the company's pricing power is the only thing keeping comps positive. That is a finite resource, and the next leg down typically arrives when the customer responds to the higher ticket.
Walmart FY2024 vs. FY2023: Reading Normalization Correctly
Walmart's full fiscal year 2024 (year ended January 31, 2024) showed the opposite pattern from Starbucks — the headline understated the strength:
- Total revenue: $648.1 billion, +6.0% year over year. 7
- Walmart U.S. comparable sales (ex-fuel, full year): +5.6%. Sam's Club ex-fuel comp: +4.0%. 7
- Q4 FY2024 Walmart U.S. comparable sales (ex-fuel): +4.0%, with transactions +4.3% and ticket −0.3%. Sam's Club Q4 ex-fuel comp: +3.1%. 7
The contrast with FY2023 (year ended January 28, 2023), when Walmart U.S. ex-fuel comps had run +7.0% and Sam's Club ex-fuel comps +14.6% 8, looks at first like deceleration. It is — but the right framing is normalization rather than weakness. FY2023 comps were inflated by post-pandemic restocking and CPI-driven trade-down, both transient. FY2024's transaction-led 4–5% range is a more sustainable mix and consistent with stable share gains rather than a pricing-driven sugar high.
The diagnostic: decelerating comps that come down to a transaction-led number are healthier than rising comps carried by ticket alone. Walmart's FY2024 reading is the former; Starbucks FY2024 is closer to the latter, despite the company posting a positive headline revenue number.
| Company / Period | Total revenue | Comp sales | Transactions | Average ticket |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Starbucks FY24 (full year) | $36.2B (+1%) | −2% global | declining | rising |
| Starbucks FY24 Q4 (US) | — | −6% | −10% | +4% |
| Walmart FY24 (full year, US ex-fuel) | $648B (+6%) | +5.6% | positive | flat-to-positive |
| Walmart FY24 Q4 (US ex-fuel) | — | +4.0% | +4.3% | −0.3% |
Two Other Pitfalls Worth Knowing
Non-GAAP revenue. Per SEC Regulation G, any non-GAAP measure must be reconciled to the nearest GAAP figure in the same filing. If a company emphasizes "adjusted revenue" or "organic revenue" and the gap to GAAP widens over time, the adjustments are doing real work and the source of that work is a fair question for the next earnings call. Use GAAP revenue for CAGR.
Currency effects on multinationals. A reported revenue line in US dollars contains both operational performance and the FX move between the prior and current period's exchange rates. Apple separates this in its FY25 10-K MD&A (where the FY24-to-FY25 6.4% reported growth would have been higher on a constant-currency basis given dollar appreciation in parts of the period). For multinationals with material non-USD revenue, constant-currency growth is the cleaner read on the operating business; reported growth in USD is the read on the investment.
Putting It to Work on One Stock
Pull a company's last three 10-Ks from SEC EDGAR. Take the GAAP total revenue line from each year's income statement, plus the prior years presented in the comparative columns, so you have at least 11 fiscal years on file. Compute the 3-, 5-, and 10-year CAGRs using the formula above. If the three numbers are within ~3 percentage points of one another, the underlying growth is roughly the number you'd quote; if they fan out by 5 points or more, no single CAGR captures the trajectory and you should be reasoning about regimes, not averages.
If the company is a retailer or restaurant operator, find the comparable sales disclosure in the MD&A — it is usually a one-paragraph table near the segment results. Note the comp number, then look one level deeper for the transactions/ticket decomposition. If the company doesn't disclose it, the next quarterly earnings call is almost always the place to find it — and the absence from the press release is itself a signal.
You will end up with two numbers per company: a CAGR that sits in a range rather than a point, and a comp split between traffic and pricing. Most retail investors never compute either. Doing both takes about ten minutes per name, and it is the cheapest way to avoid paying growth-stock multiples for a business that is shrinking on a per-store basis.
Footnotes
-
Apple Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended September 26, 2015, Consolidated Statements of Operations, total net sales $233,715 million. Filed October 28, 2015. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000320193&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40 ↩
-
Apple Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended September 26, 2020, Consolidated Statements of Operations, total net sales $274,515 million. Filed October 30, 2020. https://s2.q4cdn.com/470004039/files/doc_financials/2020/ar/_10-K-2020-(As-Filed).pdf ↩
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Apple Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended September 28, 2024, comparative income statement showing FY2024 net sales $391,035M, FY2023 $383,285M, FY2022 $394,328M. Filed November 1, 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000032019324000123/aapl-20240928.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Apple Inc., FY2025 fourth-quarter results press release (Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1), filed October 30, 2025. Total net sales of $416,161 million for fiscal year ended September 27, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000032019325000077/a8-kex991q4202509272025.htm. Confirmed in Apple's FY2025 10-K (filed November 2025): https://s2.q4cdn.com/470004039/files/doc_financials/2025/ar/_10-K-2025-As-Filed.pdf. ↩
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FactSet Research Systems, Earnings Insight, December 13, 2024. CY2024 estimated S&P 500 revenue growth of 5.1%; trailing 10-year average annual revenue growth of 5.1% (2014–2023). https://insight.factset.com/sp-500-cy-2024-earnings-preview-analysts-expect-earnings-growth-of-9.5 ↩
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Starbucks Corporation, "Starbucks Reports Q4 and Full Fiscal Year 2024 Results," October 30, 2024. Consolidated net revenues $36.2B (+1%); global comparable store sales −2% full year, −7% Q4; U.S. Q4 transactions −10%, ticket +4%; China Q4 comp −14%. https://investor.starbucks.com/news/financial-releases/news-details/2024/Starbucks-Reports-Q4-and-Full-Fiscal-Year-2024-Results/default.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Walmart Inc., "Walmart Reports Strong Q4 and FY24 Revenue and Operating Income Growth," February 20, 2024 (Q4/FY24 earnings release). Total revenue $648.1B (+6.0%); Walmart U.S. full-year ex-fuel comp +5.6%, Sam's Club ex-fuel +4.0%; Q4 Walmart U.S. ex-fuel comp +4.0% (transactions +4.3%, ticket −0.3%). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416924000019/earningsreleasefy24q4.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Walmart Inc., FY23 Q4 earnings release (February 21, 2023). Walmart U.S. full-year ex-fuel comparable sales +7.0%; Sam's Club ex-fuel +14.6%. https://stock.walmart.com/_assets/_08ee5483ec4c057568cc8774f3fd6aad/walmart/db/938/9480/presentation/earnings-presentation-fy23-q4-final.pdf ↩
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